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Timothy J. Bartik and Kevin M. Hollenbeck

Employment Effects of
the Washington High
Technology Business and
Occupation Tax Credit
This article summarizes findings from Upjohn
Institute Working Paper No. 12-187. Visit www
.upjohn.org to read the paper.

W

ashington State has a High
Technology Business and Occupation
Tax Credit that allows a credit against the
state’s gross receipts tax for firms that
exceed a certain threshold of qualified
research and development (R&D)
spending. A major purpose of this credit
is to stimulate employment growth. In
spring 2012, the Joint Legislative Audit
and Review Committee of the state
legislature contracted with the Upjohn
Institute to conduct a study that would
estimate the extent to which the High
Tech Tax Credit does, in fact, stimulate
employment growth.
To address this question, we used tax
return data from firms that claimed a tax
credit on their business and occupation
tax returns between 2004 and 2009. Companies that claim the credit must also file
the state’s Annual Tax Incentive Survey,
and we used that survey data as well.
Self-Reported Employment Creation
One question on the Tax Incentive
Survey asks firms to report “the amount
of credit claimed for the calendar year,”
and another question asks “how many

new employment positions did your firm
create in Washington State during the
calendar year?” Table 1 summarizes these
survey data by year.
Interpreted naively, these data might
seem to indicate that the credit is very
cost-effective in creating jobs. If one
assumes that all the employment created
in these firms was due to the credit, then
the credit cost per job created is low,
averaging less than $2,000 annually per
job-year (for example, the total credit
cost over all years of about $123 million
divided by about 74,000 jobs yields a
cost per job-year of $1,662).
Models
Table 1 does not reveal, however,
whether the tax credit created the
reported employment. Does causality run
from the credit to employment growth
or from growth to more credits claimed?
Firms that are expanding may choose to
spend some of their additional revenue on
R&D, thereby increasing credits claimed.
Alternatively, the tax credit may incent
firms to invest in R&D, which increases
employment. Without further evidence,
we cannot determine the direction of
causation.
Unraveling the direction of causality is
the key to estimating the effect of the tax
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Table 1 Self-Reported Employment Creation and Tax Credit, by Year
Average
Total
employment
employment
Average
Total credits taken
Year
created
created
credit ($)
($, millions)
2004
5.39
3,223
39,611
23.687
2005
31.07
16,622
31,003
16.587
2006
27.49
13,937
34,229
17.354
2007
27.05
14,309
37,499
19.837
2008
33.17
16,885
43,599
22.192
2009
18.25
9,305
46,696
23.815
All years
23.30
74,281
38,730
123.472
SOURCE: Washington Tax Incentive Survey.
credit on employment. In this study we
identified causation through instrumental
variables, which cause shifts in R&D
credits for the firms that are unrelated to
the firm’s own decisions.
Our model assumes that a firm’s hiring
decisions are based on its profits. Profits
are negatively related to costs, so hiring
is negatively related to a firm’s costs. The
high tech tax credit influences a firm’s
decision making by reducing the cost of
R&D. We assume that the effect of the
R&D subsidy on business location and
expansion decisions is proportional to
this subsidy’s effects on business costs.
The outcomes that we have analyzed
include employment and overall wages
paid at the firm. We examined how
changes in the credit subsidy affect the
firm’s growth in employment or wages,
and we estimated our model using firms’
average credit ratios and marginal credit
ratios. The latter is the additional tax
credit that would be earned by spending
one additional dollar on R&D. For many
firms, these two ratios are the same—
equal to the credit subsidy rate for that
industry and year. However, because the
credit is nonrefundable, the marginal
credit ratio drops to 0 if the amount of
the credit for which the firm is eligible
exceeds its tax liability, or if the firm’s
computed tax credit exceeds $2 million.
Hypotheses
We structure our empirical model
around how the R&D credit lowers a
business’s costs. The research literature
on state and local business taxes suggests
that the long-run effects of a 10 percent
increase in all state and local business

2

taxes is to reduce a location’s business
activity by between 1 and 6 percent
(Bartik 1991). Because state and local
business taxes have usually averaged
around 5 percent of business costs in the
United States, this implies that a onehalf of a 1 percent increase in business
costs (a 10 percent increase in business
taxes when business taxes are 5 percent
of overall costs) will reduce business
activity by between 1 and 6 percent, and
therefore a 1 percent increase in business
costs will reduce business activity by
between 2 and 12 percent. Our model is
structured so that the R&D credit variable
is scaled by its effects on business costs,
so we would expect the credit variable to
have a coefficient of between −2 and −12.
Scaling the credit by effects on business
costs means that the credit price is scaled
by the firm’s R&D spending as a share of
total costs, which is what economists call
R&D’s “factor share.”
We tried three different instrumental
variables for the R&D factor share:
1) the average R&D factor share in
Washington in an industry where the
average was calculated by omitting the
firm; 2) the national R&D factor share
for the industry using data from the
National Science Foundation; and 3) the
firm’s projected factor share in a year, in
which the projection was accomplished
by applying the national rate of R&D
expenditure growth in the industry (from
the National Science Foundation [NSF]
data) to the firm’s factor share in the first
year of data.1 All of these instrumental
variables are designed to predict a
firm’s R&D spending and credit but be
independent of the firm’s own changing
decisions. The third instrument has the

most variability because it incorporates
the most firm-specific information, which
should increase prediction in estimation.
In theory, average credit rates would
be germane to a major location decision.
If decision makers at a firm are trying to
decide whether to locate in Washington,
then they might compare the net tax
rates from several jurisdictions as part
of their decision-making process, and
in Washington that would include the
average credit rate. However, if they are
making decisions at the margin, such as
expanding R&D or employment, then
they are going to respond to the marginal
tax and credit rates.
Table 2 shows the estimation results
for models in which employment growth
and earnings growth are explained
by changes in R&D costs, using the
marginal credit ratio, for the three sets
of instrumental variables. Our preferred
specification is using the instrumental
variable that is presented in the third
column, that is, using a baseline R&D
factor share and inflating it annually
at the rate of growth of R&D in the
industry, as these estimates are the most
precise.
To estimate the job growth that
resulted from the tax credit, we used the
firms’ data and the parameters from our
preferred estimated model with the actual
marginal credit ratio and with a marginal
credit rate of 0 to predict employment
growth with and without the credit.2 We
did a similar calculation for total wages at
the firm. Table 3 presents these results.
As seen in the table, the number of
jobs created by the tax credit annually
ranged between about 380 and about
510, which represented a growth in
jobs at these firms of between 0.53 and
0.62 percent. The amount of earnings
generated in the state from these jobs
ranges from about $14.2 million to
$23.0 million. The levels of earnings
represented a growth in earnings of
between 0.20 and 0.25 percent.3 We
calculate the average cost per job created
by dividing the entries in the last column
of Table 3 by the jobs created in the
second column. These averages range
from $40,409 (2006) to $50,291 (2009).
The job creation numbers reported
in Table 3 are job-years created—they
should not be interpreted as additional
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Table 2 Effects of Changes in R&D Credit Subsidies on an Individual Firm’s Growth
Instrumental variable
Industry
National
Baseline factor
average
R&D factor share share growing at
Dependent variable/model
(without firm)
growth rate
national rate
Employment/growth
−10.44
−2.02
−4.94***
(8.06)
(6.32)
(1.92)
Earnings/growth
−13.14
−2.64
−2.90
(10.68)
(8.21)
(2.42)
NOTE: Entries are estimated effects of a credit subsidy on firm growth, scaled so that it shows the
percentage effects on firm growth of an increase in the credit subsidy received of 1 percent of
the firm’s overall business costs. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
***statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

permanent jobs created each year. Our
model estimates that a change in the
tax credit causes a once-and-for-all
permanent change in the number of jobs
in the state. Therefore, the job-years
listed in the second column should not
be summed to get a cumulative total of
jobs created. In other words, our model
estimates that if policymakers had
eliminated the tax credit in 2009, the
level of jobs in these firms would have
been permanently lower by 484 jobs.
Furthermore, only about 40 percent
of the employment creation in this
study occurred in industries that would
be expected to be “export-based”
industries, that is, to primarily sell
goods and services outside the state of
Washington. For non-export-based firms,
any expansion of the firms receiving
the tax credit would likely reduce sales
of other firms in that same industry in
Washington, as they are competing for

the same Washington customers, with
little net effects on state employment. If
there is a multiplier of 2.0 for the exportbased firms, and 0.0 for the non-exportbased firms, the net employment creation
would be approximately 80 percent as
large as the numbers in Table 3.
Conclusion
Our analyses of tax credit data suggest
that the Washington high tech R&D
tax credit does increase employment
to a very modest extent. The analyses
suggest that, because of the tax credit,
employment grew by between 0.5 and 0.6
percent at the firms that claimed credits.
Our preferred specification suggests that
firms respond to the marginal credit rate,
which we should note is zero for slightly
less than one-quarter of the sample.
The cost per job created implied by
these estimates is relatively high. The

Table 3 Estimated Employment and Earnings Creation, by Year
Total credit taken
Year
Employment
Earnings ($, millions)
($, millions)
2005
378
14.244
18.541
(84, 672)
(−9.528, 38.016)
2006
430
18.988
17.376
(96, 764)
(−12.702, 50.678)
2007
469
21.114
19.487
(117, 833)
(−14.125, 56.353)
2008
511
23.019
22.672
(114, 907)
(−15.399, 61.437)
2009
484
20.728
24.341
(108, 860)
(−13.866, 55.322)
NOTE: Table entries in the second and third columns are estimated jobs and earnings created as a
result of the R&D tax credit. The entries in parentheses are the lower and upper bounds of a 95
percent confidence interval. The “credit taken” data are derived from tax return data, and hence
differ slightly from the survey data reported in Table 1.

range in the above estimates is from just
over $40,000 to just over $50,000 per
job created. Although the jobs created
may pay more than those figures, not all
earnings generated are a pure benefit. We
know from previous studies that only a
portion of newly created jobs actually
result in increased local employment
rates and earnings per capita. Up to fourfifths of all new jobs in a state will end
up being reflected in higher population
rather than higher state employment rates.
That is, a 1 percent increase in a state’s
employment is estimated to lead after 5
or more years to a 0.8 percent increase in
state population, with a resulting increase
of 0.2 percent in the state’s employment
to population ratio (Bartik 1991, 1993).
Some of the new jobs will also help state
residents advance to better-paying jobs
than would have occurred otherwise, as
the new jobs make it easier for them to
be hired in better-paying occupations.
Estimates suggest that a 1 percent
increase in a state’s employment leads
to a 0.2 percent increase in earnings per
capita due to state residents moving up to
better-paying occupations (Bartik 1991).
Combining these two effects, a 1
percent increase in jobs, which would
directly increase state earnings by 1
percent if the jobs pay similarly to the
average state job, will actually lead to a
somewhat lower 0.4 percent increase in
state earnings per capita: 0.2 percent due
to higher state employment rates, and 0.2
percent due to state residents moving up
to better-paying occupations. The boost
in state earnings of 0.4 percent is 40
percent of the 1 percent extra earnings
directly associated with the new jobs.
Therefore, in evaluating the benefits for
state residents from new jobs, only about
40 percent of the earnings from the new
jobs lead to higher earnings per capita for
state residents.
Why is the cost per job created in
this study relatively high? Four reasons
seem most important. First, this study
finds that, consistent with the research
literature, state and local business activity
is only modestly responsive to lower
costs. Second, for the firms receiving this
particular tax credit, the ratio of earnings
and output to employment is relatively
high, which implies that a given dollar
tax credit has more modest percentage
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effects in lowering overall business costs.
Third, a significant proportion of the tax
credits are capped, which means that
on the margin these tax credits do not
lower the costs of expanding Washington
employment. Fourth, a significant
proportion of the tax credits are awarded
to non-export-based firms, which will
have lower effects on overall Washington
employment.
These explanations point to ways
to lower the cost per job created from
this policy. In particular, targeting
export-based firms with high multiplier
effects, and making sure that incentives
affect marginal costs to firms that are
expanding, will help reduce the cost per
job created. Higher multiplier effects
will be more likely if firms have stronger
local supplier links. Finally, if the goal is
job creation, directly tying the magnitude
of the incentive to job creation provides a
greater reason for firms to respond to the
incentive with job creation.
Notes
1. Dr. Raymond Wolfe of the NSF
graciously assisted us in navigating the NSF
data, and released the 2008 and 2009 data
slightly early.
2. Note that many firms’ marginal credit
ratio is 0, so that no simulated job creation
occurs at these firms.
3. The fact that wages increased less than
employment suggests that the credit had a
negative impact on wages per employee. This
finding is not surprising because one would
assume that new hires make, on average,
less than incumbent workers. In addition,
lower-wage firms may have higher percentage
effects of the tax credit on costs.
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Françoise Carré and Chris Tilly

Part-Time and Short Hours
in Retail in the United
States, Canada, and Mexico
How Institutions Matter

I

n sectors where full-time schedules
do not dominate, total hours matter
greatly for job quality. We explore hour
levels and trends in retail trade, which is
known for part-time work. We compare
the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
taking advantage of the fact that work
hours regulations vary cross-nationally.
By comparing retail hour levels and
trends, we contribute insights into policy
and regulatory impacts on job quality.
Our analysis draws mainly on publicly
available data from national statistical
offices in the three countries; from 419

U.S. retail relies heavily on parttime workers, who increasingly
are guaranteed very few weekly
hours, but are expected to “flex
up” to 40 hours on demand.
field interviews with retail executives,
managers, and workers in the United
States and Mexico; and from secondary
sources.
Retail Hours—Cause for
Policy Concern
The issue of insufficient hours is
ubiquitous in U.S. retail. Schedules
are driven by retailers’ extension of
opening hours, and by wide swings in
shopping flows throughout the day and
week, as well as seasonally. Retail in the
United States relies heavily on part-time
workers, who increasingly are guaranteed
very few weekly hours, but are expected
to “flex up” to 40 hours on demand.
Moreover, today even the full-time-hours
guarantee falls below 40 hours, and often
below 35.

These patterns have significant
implications for the workforce. Lower
standard hours reduce the base level of
weekly earnings that workers—full- and
part-time—can rely upon. Additionally,
retailers’ scheduling practices generate
variability and unpredictability in
individuals’ total hours and in the
distribution of these hours. Part-timers
receive few or no benefits and usually
a lower hourly wage than full-time
workers. For these reasons, retail
work hours and the firm strategies and
institutional factors that drive them
warrant attention.
In each of the countries we examined,
long and expanding hours of operation
create two managerial goals: 1) control
labor costs with lean staffing, and 2)
closely match staffing levels to customer
flow. However, in the United States and
Canada, these twin goals lead retailers to
shorten employee work hours and expand
part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico they
lead retailers to lengthen hours.
The three countries provide a useful
comparison. They are neighbors and
share many of the same retail chains—
Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both
the United States and Mexico and is one
of the top retailers in Canada as well. Yet
the labor market and social protection
institutions of the three countries are
quite distinct, with important implications
for hours of work.
Contrasting Hours in Canada,
the United States, and Mexico
We find differing levels and trends in
retail hours across the three countries in
recent decades. Table 1 provides average
weekly hours levels; data are broadly
comparable multiyear averages (see
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Carré and Tilly [2012a] for sources and
definitions). Compared to the economywide average, U.S. and Canadian retail
employees work shorter hours, while
Mexican retail workers put in longer
hours.
The United States has the shortest
average hours—they are shorter than in
Canada except in the grocery subsector.
Mexico has the longest hours economywide, and even longer hours in retail.
Mexican statistics must be seen within
the national context: our fieldwork
indicates that Mexican retailers press
workers to work unpaid additional
hours. In the United States, supervisors,
who are not subject to the overtime
premium, work much longer hours than
nonsupervisory workers; in Mexico,
the reverse is true, consistent with a
management regime built on extending
worker hours.
In Canada and the United States,
1987–2009 time trends for employee
hours are negative for total, retail, and

In the United States, supervisors
work much longer hours than
nonsupervisory workers; in
Mexico, the reverse is true.
grocery employment, but the negative
time trend is more marked in Canada
than in the United States: a loss of 1.8
hours over 20 years after controlling
for cyclical effects, as compared to the
0.2 hour U.S. loss (see Carré and Tilly
[2012b] for details).1 We lack detailed
time series data on Mexico and thus did
not make a parallel estimate of trends.
How Institutional Environment
Matters: Three Patterns
Patterns of hours reflect sector-specific
strategies but also significant differences
in institutional environments—notably
between Mexico and its two northern
neighbors, but also to some degree
between the United States and Canada.
Retailers have parallel practices in
Canada and the United States; they
control unit labor costs by paying lower
hourly wages and in most cases extending
fewer benefits to part-time workers
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than to full-time workers. Still, these
practices take place against a backdrop
of institutional characteristics with
significantly different implications. The
U.S. institutional environment for retail
jobs is best characterized as regulatory
“flexibility.” Retail hours of operation
are not regulated at the federal and state
levels; there are few (and diminishing)
local statutory limits on opening hours.
Retail entry-level wages are pegged at or
slightly above the minimum wage, which
is low relative to the economy-wide
median and has declined in real terms.
Collective bargaining, which historically
has improved compensation, covers a
declining share of workers (reaching 5
percent in retail and 17 percent in grocery
in 2011).
Canada’s institutional environment
represents a form of “constrained
flexibility.” Its industry regulation is
broadly similar to that of the United
States, but it has different norms in
regard to labor standards and social
protection. As provinces have relaxed
their restrictions on Sunday and holiday
opening, legal regulation of opening
hours has moved in the same direction as
in the United States, but it has changed
more recently in Canada. The steeper
1987–2009 decline in hours in Canada
reflects adoption of these practices in

Canadian retail starting in the 1980s,
then accelerating in the 1990s, whereas
these same practices had been longstanding in the United States by the late
1980s. Furthermore, in grocery retail
and general merchandise, severe price
competition also hit later. When it did, in
the early 1990s, management in Canadian
unionized grocery chains sought to
reopen contracts, dissolve pattern
bargaining, and redesign jobs (Kainer
2002). These changes, entailing greater
use of part-time workers, spread quickly.
Today Canadian retail has high rates of

Retailers in Canada and the
United States control unit labor
costs by paying lower hourly
wages and extending fewer
benefits to part-time workers.
part-time workers (35.5 percent of wage
employment in 2004, compared to 28
percent in the United States, although
Canada uses a lower threshold, 30 hours).
Still, even by 2007, the end of our
study period, Canadian retail hours
were on the whole higher than in the
United States, and the implications for
workers were mitigated. Very shorthour part-time work (less than 20 hours)
appears to be less prevalent in Canada.

Table 1 Average Weekly Hours for the United States, Canada, and Mexico
(multiyear averages)
U.S.
Canada Mexico
Total
All private, nonsupervisory, 1987–2009
34.13
Total, all employees, 1987–2009
36.69
All private, all employees, 1998/2003/2008
(Economic Census)
47.66
Retail
Nonsupervisory, 1987–2009
30.65
All employees, 1987–2009
33.04
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census)
51.57
Nonsupervisory, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census)
51.94
Grocery
Nonsupervisory, 1990–2009
31.08
All employees, 1990–2009
30.50
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census)
54.88
NOTE: Hours from Mexico’s Economic Census imputed by assuming 52 weeks of work a year,
thus weekly hours may be underestimated.
SOURCE: Carré and Tilly (2012b).
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Moreover, the impacts of part-time
work are buffered by nearly universal
access to health insurance. Differential
treatment does remain because several
employer-based benefits are not readily
available to part-time workers—namely
employer pensions, paid time off, and
supplemental health insurance—but
the cost advantage to retailers of parttime employment is reduced in Canada.
Finally, Canadian retail has retained
significant rates of collective bargaining
coverage, boosting compensation. In
2004, union coverage amounted to 15
percent of retail employment and 42
percent in grocery (compared to 6 and 18
percent, respectively, in the United States
that year). In recent years, provincial
minimum wage levels have remained
higher, relative to the average wage, than
the U.S. federal minimum wage.
In contrast, the institutional structure
regulating Mexican retail jobs can be
characterized as “unevenly regulated
dualism.” While much of the retail
industry in Mexico takes place in
informal and family businesses, which
typically evade regulation, the country
has a growing number of modern retail
outlets, including hypermarkets. Formal
retail businesses face a regulatory regime
quite distinct from that in the other two
countries.
Mexican institutions motivate
employers—especially retailers—to
set longer hours. Four elements of the
institutional environment of larger
stores have a particular impact: 1)
a long workweek, 2) the day-based
minimum wage, 3) universal social
insurance, and 4) weak unions and
limited enforcement. Mexico’s full-time
workweek is 48 hours (six days times
eight hours), with overtime provisions
only applying beyond this point. The
minimum wage there is set by daily pay
and not hourly pay. Mexican law also
mandates universal social insurance
(through employer contributions), though
the level is low and workers with greater
market power generally get plans above
the minimum. The first three provisions
weaken the incentive to use part-time
employment: 1) the 48-hour workweek
facilitates covering weekends without
part-timers, 2) the minimum wage sets

6
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a daily pay floor that vitiates the cost
advantage of short-hour workers if the
wage level is close to the minimum,
and 3) universal social insurance bars
(at least as a matter of law) a strategy
of excluding part-timers from the most
expensive benefits. The daily wage,
however, also sets an economic incentive
to push workers to work unpaid hours
beyond the statutory eight hours. Finally,
the bulk of retail unions negotiate socalled “protection” contracts (whereby
corrupt union leadership colludes with
management) that offer workers little if
any representation or recourse against
standards violations.
In short, national institutional
environments can shape employer
incentives and thus worker hours with
significant job quality implications. The
Canadian and Mexican examples suggest
possible U.S. policy options to mitigate

The institutional structure
regulating Mexican retail
jobs can be characterized as
“unevenly regulated dualism.”
the problems of short and variable
hours—for example, instituting a daily
as well as an hourly minimum wage
would reduce employers’ incentives to
create very short shifts (in a number of
states, recently instituted “reporting pay”
requirements that ensure a minimum
pay when called into work should have
similar effects); so would policies that
reduce the cost differentials between fulltime and part-time workers. Given the
importance of work hours as a job quality
indicator in retail and other service
work, these possibilities merit further
exploration.
Notes
This research was funded through an
Upjohn Policy grant. We thank the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for providing funding for
this research. For earlier and parallel research
that also contributed to this work, we thank
the Russell Sage Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the
Fulbright Program. Special thanks to Diana
Denham and Brandynn Holgate for excellent
research assistance.

1. In the grocery subsector, time trend
begins in 1990.
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The Health and
Wealth of a Nation

The Workforce
Investment Act

Education Reform
and the Limits
of Policy

Employer-Based Health
Insurance and the
Affordable Care Act
Nan L. Maxwell
Maxwell examines the behavior of
firms with respect to their provision of
health care prior to ACA deliberations
and uses those behaviors to forecast
changes in
employersponsored
health insurance
(ESI) once the
ACA is fully
implemented.
Her analysis
focuses on
potential
changes in the
ESI offer due to implementation of
ACA provisions concerning access and
quality.
Maxwell’s findings include:
• The ACA will likely influence
the behavior of virtually all firms that
offered health insurance at the time of
its passage.
• The ACA is unlikely to incentivize
small firms to offer health insurance if
they did not already offer it when the
act was passed.
• The differences in ESI coverage
and quality of the offer made to lowwage and high-wage workers are likely
to converge when the ACA is fully
implemented.
• Disparities in the offer of benefits
other than health insurance might
increase between low-wage and highwage firms.
203 pp. 2012
$40.00 cloth 978-0-88099-425-5
$20.00 paper 978-0-88099-423-1

Implementation Experiences
and Evaluation Findings

Lessons from Michigan

Douglas J. Besharov and
Phoebe H. Cottingham, eds.

Michael F. Addonizio and
C. Philip Kearney

The Workforce Investment Act
(WIA), the nation’s single largest source
of funding
for workforce
development
efforts, is
currently up for
reauthorization.
This book
provides the most
comprehensive
and up-to-date
look yet at WIA’s
program performance and impact. The
papers included are organized into five
areas:
1) understanding WIA,
2) program implementation,
3) performance management,
4) impact evaluations, and
5) future evaluation choices.
In addition, the contributors detail how
WIA performance management systems
function and present various evaluation
techniques for assessing workforce
programs.
“There is something here for everyone,
ranging from practitioners to hard-core
applied econometricians.”—Journal of
Regional Science

Addonizio and Kearney use
Michigan as a laboratory to examine
a set of commonly implemented
educational
reforms. They
begin by
examining one
of the most
contentious
issues facing
education:
Does more
money make
schools better?
Next, they examine accountability
systems for Michigan’s schools
and whether they meet the federal
directives of No Child Left Behind.
The authors also address the growing
trend of school choice, both the
options for parents to select charter
schools for their children to attend
or to send them out-of-district via a
“school of choice” program.
The book concludes with a
discussion of what has been gleaned
from the successes and failures of
various reform efforts, and based on
the authors’ observations and analysis,
their thoughts and ideas for the future
of education reform.
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